STANDARDS, TRADE AND PROTECTION: THE CASE OF GMOS by Anderson, Kym & Jackson, Lee Ann
  1 
 
 
Standards, trade and protection: 









Kym Anderson and Lee Ann Jackson 
 
 
School of Economics and 
Centre for International Economic Studies 
University of Adelaide 




Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 












Copyright 2004 by Kym Anderson and Lee Ann Jackson.  All rights reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by 





We acknowledge with thanks funding support from Australia’s Rural Industries Research and 
Development Corporation and the Australian Research Council. We are also grateful for the 
support provided by Susan Stone, then of the Productivity Commission, in sharing data used 
for their GTAP model aggregation. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 6
th 
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Schevenignen, Netherlands, 13-15 June 
2003 and at seminars at the USDA’s Economic Research Service on 17 June, the World Bank   2 
on 2 October and the University of Minnesota on 7 November 2003. Helpful comments from 
participants at those meetings, and from our colleague Richard Damania, are gratefully 
acknowledged. Views expressed and any remaining errors are our own.   3 
Abstract 
 
  A global economy-wide model (GTAP) is used to go beyond estimating how 
GM crop variety adoption affects adopting and non-adopting economies, with or 
without policy responses to this technology, by indicating effects also on real incomes 
of farmers. The results suggest the EU moratorium on imports of GM food helps EU 
farmers even though it requires them to forego the productivity boost they could 
receive from the new biotechnology. An upper-bound estimate of the cost of that EU 
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Genetically modified (GM) crop varieties account for one-quarter of the global land 
area planted to maize, soybean and canola and cotton, (and 4.3 per cent of all arable 
land). This represents a dramatic increase from the pre-1996 level, when GM 
production  was close to zero.  Three countries dominate global production of GM 
food products  : Argentina, Canada and the United States (US).  In these countries 
production cost savings and minimal regulatory impediments have lead to rapid 
farmer adoption, and the GM shares of those crops average more than 60 per cent 
(James 2003). The US alone produces more than 40 per cent of of the world's maize 
and soybean, and its shares in global exports (including intra-EU trade) are 66 and 51 
per cent, respectively. By contrast the European Union (EU) produces only six per 
cent of the world’s maize and one per cent of the soybean.  EU Farmers therefore 
benefit much less from adopting GM varieties of these crops than US farmers.  Since 
1998 when the EU implemented a moratorium, GM-adopting countries have lost EU 
market share to GM-free suppliers, particularly Brazil for maize and soybean and 
Australia and Central  Europe in the case of canola (Foster, Berry and Hogan 2003). 
This has strengthened fears that EU members and possibly other food-importing 
countries would discount or deny market access to products of food-exporting 
countries if any GM crops are grown in,  or even imported into, those exporting 
countries.   
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  To what extent have relatively low farmer payoffs, as opposed to  strong 
opposition by some consumer and other community groups, motivated the EU’s 
moratorium on GM crop variety approval?  The conventional explanation for the US-
EU difference in GM regulations is that Europeans care more about the natural 
environment than do Americans, and trust their food safety regulators less. While not 
denying either of those possibilities, we seek further possible explanations in the first 
section of the paper. These are tested empirically using a modified version of the 
GTAP data and simulation model of the global economy, described in the second 
section. We go beyond earlier analysts (e.g., Nielsen and Anderson 2001; van Meijl 
and van Tongeren 2002; Nielsen, Robinson and Theirfelder 2003) by providing 
empirical estimates of the distributional effects within countries of GM production, 
consumption and import policies. The final section describes the political economy 
implications of these results.  
 
Why do national GM policies diverge? 
 
The precautionary stance taken by EU towards GM food contradicts previous 
statements made by the EU scientific community  (European Commission 2001), 
implying that policy makers may have alternative motivations than the promotion of 
food safety and environmental health.   Political economic theories suggest that 
governments respond to both public and private interest group pressure.  Apart from 
differences in environmental preferences or in  consumer trust in food safety 
authorities, the EU may have banned GM products to enhance the EU’s monopoly 
power in international food markets (the optimal tariff argument, resurrected recently 
by Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Although this motivation seems unlikely given that the  
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EU’s already maintains high import barriers to many farm products and is foregoing 
the productivity gains of the new biotechnology, we test it empirically.  
Private interest group theory  (Grossman and Helpman 1995) offers a more 
likely explanation for the policy differences.  Anti-GM protest groups  and 
biotechnology firms are active lobby groups on both sides of the Atlantic, so neither 
group is  likely to be acting as the primary policy driver.  The most obvious other 
interest group with an economic stake in these policies is the farm lobby.  
US farmers clearly have a strong interest in a low degree of GM crop 
regulation, so that they can exploit the new technology before it is disseminated 
beyond the US. The interests of EU farmers, however, are less clear-cut. Had they 
been allowed to adopt,  EU  crop farmers would have benefited very little to date 
because the first-available GM food crops (maize and soybean) are of minor direct 
importance to them.  In addition, because  their landscape  is much more densely 
settled buffer zoning  costs more per hectare of GM crop there than in broad-acre 
landscapes such as in the US. On the other hand, the EU livestock sector, which is 
almost as big as that of the US, has an interest in lower costs of feedstuffs. But given 
that North America and Argentina have already adopted GM technology, EU food 
producers may be more competitive than GM adopters in their own and in third-
country markets if consumers in those markets are sufficiently GM-averse, and  if 
these markets require compliance with strict labelling regulations for GM foods. If 
those strict labelling and high standards also applied to feed ingredients (as is intended 
in the EU from now on), then EU livestock producers also could support anti-GM 
policies since they are unlikely to benefit as much from the GM technology as maize-
and-soybean-intensive North American livestock producers.  
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The GTAP model modifications and scenarios 
To test the theory that farm interest groups have an economic stake in GM 
policies empirically, we use a well-received empirical model of the global economy 
(the GTAP model) to examine the effects on national and farmer welfare of some 
countries adopting the new GMO technology without and then with government and 
consumer responses in other countries. The Version 5.4 database used for these 
applications (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) draws on the global economic 
structures and trade flows of 1997, just prior to the EU moratorium on GM crop 
varieties (See Hertel, 1998 for comprehensive model documentation.  The model is 
solved with GEMPACK software described in Harrison and Pearson, 1996).   
The simulations use a standard, long-run, neoclassical GTAP closure. This 
closure is characterized by perfect competition in all markets, flexible exchange rates 
and fixed endowments of labour, capital, land and natural resources.  One outcome of 
this specification is that wages are flexible and the labour market operates at full 
employment.  This assumption can play an important role in the incidence of 
technological change in agriculture, particularly for the landless poor, however an 
analysis of the effects of this assumption is beyond the scope of this paper.  In 
addition investment funds are allocated among regions to equate the change in 




In our GTAP simulations we assume 45 per cent of US and Canadian coarse 
grain production is GM. When they are assumed to adopt, all Latin American 
countries and Australia adopt GM coarse grains at two-thirds the level of the US (i.e.,  
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30 per cent of coarse grain production is GM) while all other countries adopt GM 
coarse grains at one-third the level of US adoption (i.e., 15 per cent of coarse grain 
production is GM). For oilseeds, we assume that 75 per cent of oilseed production in 
the US, Canada, Argentina and Brazil is GM. Again Other Latin American countries 
and Australia are assumed to adopt at two-thirds the extent of the major adopters and 
the remaining regions adopt at one-third the extent of the major adopters.  
The adopting sectors are each sub-divided into GM and non-GM varieties, and 
an output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral productivity shock is implemented on the GM 
varieties of these commodities to capture their higher productivity. This assumption 
leads to a uniform reduction in the level of primary factors inputs needed per unit of 
GM  output.
1 When a region does not adopt GM technologies, no regional factor 
productivity shock is included and no distinction is made between GM and non-GM 
production in these regions. In the constant-elasticity-of-substitution production nest, 
producers choose first between imported and domestic inputs according to the 
model’s Armington elasticities, and then choose whether or not to use GM or non-GM 
intermediate inputs in their production of final goods.  
 
Consumption 
In order to capture consumer aversion to GM products, two changes are made 
to the traditional GTAP demand structure. First, elasticities of substitution between 
GM and non-GM products in the European Union, Australia and New Zealand where 
consumers are GM-averse are set at low levels to capture the perceived low 
substitutability of these products. In addition, preference shift parameters are included 
to capture the group of consumers in some countries that, because of food safety 
and/or environmental concerns, refuses to consume GM crops regardless of their  
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price. In such cases a 25 per cent reduction in final demand for output of crops that 
may contain GMOs is assumed, following Nielsen and Anderson (2001). 
 
Factor ownership 
We examine the effects on intra-regional distribution of income by dividing the 
economy into three groups of households: farmers, unskilled labourers, and owners of 
human and other capital. Income of each group comes from a combination of factors. 
Farm households earn income from farm and non-farm activities. The existing GTAP 
database provides information about the availability and use of land, unskilled labour, 
skilled labour, other natural resources and other capital in the agricultural sector, and 
likewise in other sectors. Non-farm activities of farm households are assumed to earn 
income from factors in the same proportion as activities conducted by the typical 
urban capital-owning household. Hence factor shares for farm households are a 
weighted sum of factor shares used in agricultural production and the factor income 
shares of capital owners.
2 The shares of farm household income from non-farm 
activities are assumed to be 90 per cent in Japan and Korea, 50 per cent in China and 
the EU, 35 per cent in US and Canada, 25 per cent in Australia, New Zealand, and 
Eastern Europe, and 20 per cent in the remaining developing countries. The 
expenditure shares are assumed to be the same for all households, so real household 
incomes are calculated simply by deflating by the consumer price index. 
 
Simulations 
Several sets of simulations are considered below to address the questions 
posed in the introduction. We look at the impacts of GM adoption by the US, Canada 
and Argentina first, without and then with policy reactions in other countries. Then we  
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add the EU to the list of adopters to explore the tradeoffs for the EU between 
productivity growth via GM adoption and the benefits of remaining GM-free given 
the prior move to adopt in the Americas. Following Stone et al. (2002), these model 
simulations assume that total factor productivity is higher for GM than for non-GM 
varieties by 6 per cent for oilseeds and 7.5 per cent for coarse grains; in the later cases 
of rice and wheat, a modest 5 per cent productivity difference is assumed to provide a 
conservative estimate of the impact of adoption of these two crops. 
The base case is compared with several alternative scenarios. One involves an 
EU moratorium on GM imports from Argentina, the US and Canada, where it is 
assumed there is no segregation between GM and non-GM products and therefore the 
EU import ban (modelled as a prohibitive tariff) is imposed on all coarse grains and 
oilseeds from those three GM adopters. Another scenario assumes the EU, Japan and 
Korea implement labelling policies that allow consumers to choose between non-GM 
products and those that may contain GM content. In this option, diehard consumers in 
the EU, Korea and Japan avoid consuming coarse grains and oilseeds. (This is 
modelled as a 25 per cent reduction in final consumption of coarse grains and oilseeds 
in those countries.) In a third alternative scenario the EU abandons its stand against 
GM products while all other countries remain non-adopters. A final scenario assumes 
that the EU's acceptance of GM products would induce the rest of the world to adopt 
GM varieties of coarse grains and oilseeds as well.  
 
Model results 
The aggregate economic welfare effects of these various cases are summarized 
in Table 1 for all scenarios.  Table 2 presents the welfare effects  for the first two  
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scenarios  disaggregated into three parts: resource allocative efficiency effects, 
changes in the region’s terms of trade, and technological change.  
The global benefits of the first group’s GM adoption is substantial (US$2.3 
billion per year) if there are no adverse reactions elsewhere.  The major importing 
regions of the EU and Northeast Asia share about one-quarter of the global benefits, 
while  Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa experience 
small welfare declines (because of an adverse change in their terms of trade and, in 
the case of Brazil, a reduction in resource allocative efficiency).  In the absence of any 
adverse reactions abroad, the GM-adopting countries expand their output and net 
exports of coarse grains and oilseeds (and meat) while the opposite happens in the rest 
of the world. Consumption of these products expands in all regions because they are 
now cheaper, but especially in the GM-adopting regions since in this model the 
Armington assumption ensures that imported products are an imperfect substitute for 
domestically produced products. 
When the EU imposes its moratorium, however, this is similar to an increase 
in farm protection there and causes the EU to be worse off by $3.1 billion per year 
(less whatever value EU consumers place on having avoided consuming GM 
products).  In addition this policy leads to a one-third reduction in  the gain to GM-
adopting North America,  a welfare  improvement  for Brazil, and a slight welfare 
decline for food-importing regions of the rest of the world. However, when the EU 
moratorium is imposed on imports from GM-adopting countries, the international 
prices of coarse grains and oilseeds fall more – and GM-adopting countries slightly 
reduce their output of these crops. In Europe, output expands because the import ban 
drives up domestic prices.  
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Suppose the EU  provided labelling information and allowed  individual EU 
consumers to respond according to their preferences.  If one-quarter of them simply 
avoided these products because they may contain GMOs, the welfare effects are 
almost the same as in the base case, because even though there is less EU 
consumption there is also less protected production in high-cost Europe and therefore 
less resource waste.  Alternatively, if the EU allowed GM adoption, it would gain 
more from its own productivity gains.  In this case,  net importers of these products 
elsewhere in the world would also experience welfare improvement, while net 
exporters of coarse grains and oilseeds (both GM adopters and non-adopters) would 
experience welfare declines.  The net global gains would be just seven per cent more 
than in the base case because coarse grains and oilseeds are minor crops in the EU 
compared with North America, assuming the EU moratorium has no impact on the 
GM policies of other countries. 
However, if the rest of the world became uninhibited about adopting GM 
varieties of these crops, global welfare would increased by nearly twice as much as it 
would when just North America and Argentina adopt.  While the EU too would gain 
more in this scenario because of improved terms of trade, almost all of the extra 
global gains would be enjoyed by developing countries (final column of Table 1). 
The cost of the EU’s policy stance can be thought of as in the range of the 
difference between columns four and two and the difference between columns two 
and  five of Table 1, depending on how much one believes the EU’s stance is 
determining the rest of the world’s reluctance to adopt GM varieties of these crops. 
For the EU that cost range is (406 + 3145 =) $3551 million to (595 + 3145 =) $3740 
million per year, while for the world as a whole the range is (2.43+ 1.24 =) $3.67 
billion to (4.05+ 1.24 =) $5.29 billion per year.  
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 In at least two respects the estimate of a $5.3 billion welfare improvement 
understates the global welfare cost of the EU’s policy. First, the second scenario in 
Table 1 (the EU moratorium) ignores the fact that the EU’s stance has already induced 
some other countries to also impose similar moratoria. Sri Lanka was perhaps the first 
developing country to ban the production and importation of GM foods. In 2001 
China did the same (with some relaxation in 2002), having been denied access to the 
EU for its soy sauce exports because they may have been produced using GM 
soybeans imported by China from the US. If that China moratorium was included 
along with the EU moratorium, the global welfare loss in scenario 2 is -$2548 million 
instead of -$1243 million per year. And second, these comparative static simulations 
ignore the dynamic impacts of on-going GM food research and development activities 
and the considerable reductions in  investment in this area  influenced by the EU’s 
extreme policy stance.  
 
What do the results suggest about GM policy drivers? 
 Two political economy questions were raised earlier in the paper. Is the EU policy 
response to GM adoption in the Americas consistent with a public-interest strategy 
aimed at capturing terms of trade benefits for the EU; and are the policy responses by 
the EU consistent with the theory of special-interest politics whereby farmers benefit 
from the policy chosen even if the national economy as a whole is worse off?  
 
EU terms of trade  
The terms of trade for the EU improve when the EU implements a moratorium 
in response to North America and Argentina  adoption of  GM coarse grains and 
oilseeds. However, the extent of farm protection provided by the moratorium is far  
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more than is optimal in terms of boosting EU economic welfare through improved 
terms of trade. The comparison shows that EU welfare is $3.4 billion per year lower 
because of the moratorium: the loss in allocative efficiency of $3.6 billion greatly 
outweighs the gain from the terms of trade change of just $0.2 billion (compare the 
upper and lower parts of Table 2). 
A comparison of the final two columns of Table 1 reveals that if the EU 
abandoned its moratorium and allow domestic production and imports of GM coarse 
grains and oilseeds, the EU would gain from its own actions.  If this policy change  
induced other countries to also allow GM production of those crops, the EU welfare 
would improve by an additional (595 – 406 =) $189 million per year, due to a further 
improvement in the EU’s terms of trade.  Clearly these results do not support the view 
that an improvement in the terms of trade is  the primary  reason for the EU’s 
protectionist response to GM adoption by others. 
 
The farm lobby 
The alternative explanation suggested earlier is that the EU farm lobby stands 
to gain from the current policy regime although farmers forego access to a lower-cost 
technology. The effects on real farm household incomes, summarized in Table 3, are 
indeed consistent with this political economy. The first three rows of Table 3 show 
Argentinean farmers' incomes  increase slightly  and farmers' income in the US and 
Canada decreases only slightly as a result of their adoption of GM varieties. Even 
though the productivity gains are more than offset by the price declines for North 
American farmers (since they are such a dominant part of the global market for maize 
and soybean), if any small sub-set of those farmers did not adopt they would be even 
worse off by suffering the price decline but not enjoying the productivity growth.   
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Note from columns two and three of Table 3 that American farmer income 
declines  greatly  when  the EU  imposes a  moratorium, but declines only a small 
amount when the EU allows consumers avoid GM products by implementing a GM-
labelling regime. EU farmers' income, on the other hand, declines slightly if there is 
GM adoption in the Americas, but increases when the EU imposes a moratorium on 
American imports.  That advantage disappears if either EU consumers are allowed to 
choose for themselves or if EU farmers are allowed to adopt GM varieties (in which 
case the price decline evidently fully offsets the productivity gain for them – see 
columns 1 to 4 of row 8 of Table 3).  
In short, the EU ban on production and imports of products that may contain 
GMOs harms American farmers' and benefits EU farmers, compared with the EU’s 
alternatives of embracing the new technology or allowing EU consumers the right to 
choose. These results are thus not inconsistent with the hypothesis that farm interest 
group influence GM policy in these regions.
3 
 
Implications for the global trading system and developing countries  
These findings have worrying implications for the global trading system. If it 
is in the interests of farmers in food-importing countries of Europe and elsewhere to 
forego adopting this new biotechnology i n order to reduce their competitive 
disadvantage vis a vis more-efficient export-oriented producers, then those protected 
producers have incentives to join with consumer and environmental groups and lobby 
for tough GMO standards.  It would not even be in the interests of Cairns Group 
farmers in Australia and New Zealand to oppose that stance. These standards could 
replace traditional forms of government assistance to agriculture, which current trade 
negotiations are seeking to dismantle in agricultural-protectionist countries. Not only  
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would that negate the benefits of negotiating lower farm support programs in the 
current Doha round of WTO negotiations, but it could increase friction in the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body.  
For developing countries, our results show that the EU moratorium benefits 
food-importers (and Japan and Korea), because of an improvement in their terms of 
trade. However, the above analysis does not take into account that moratoria will slow 
the investment in agricultural biotechnology, and  thus reduce future market and 
technological spillovers to developing countries. Furthermore, future generations of 
GM products are likely to provide health and nutritional benefits to consumers, as in 
GM rice enhanced with Vitamin A. The costs of delaying investments in those GM 
technologies will fall heavily on the world’s poor consumers (Anderson, Jackson and 
Nielsen 2004).  
In contrast to trade moratoria, labelling policies potentially provide a 
mechanism for accommodating consumers’ preferences for n on-GM food, although 
not without some cost to the global economy in terms of necessary identity 
preservation systems. Their adoption in place of the current EU ban would provide 
both rich-country and poor-country consumers with greater choice than they currently 
have. However, more economic modelling research is required to include the costs of 
segregating GM-inclusive and GM-free products and to explore the incidence of the 
identity preservation cost between GM and non-GM farmers, between farmers as a 
group and others, and between rich and poor countries. 
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TTable 1: Economic welfare effects of GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by 
various regions 
 
      (equivalent variation in income, US$ million) 
 
 
















   
United States  939  628  936  928  897 
Canada  72  7  67  70  65 
Argentina  312  247  310  307  287 
Brazil  -36  256  -46  -53  317 
Other Latin America  125  184  130  128  356 
Australia  -9  -4  -10  -10  2 
New Zealand  -5  2  -5  -5  -6 
EU-15  267  -3145  326  406  595 
Eastern Europe  7  -10  9  8  35 
China  107  111  113  110  235 
India  0  3  1  0  252 
Japan + Korea  322  341  178  335  430 
Other Asia  36  44  39  37  134 
South Africa  3  7  4  4  9 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -2  14  -2  -2  60 
Rest of World  152  75  169  167  380 
WORLD  2290  -1243  2219  2429  4047 
 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.  
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Table 2:  Economic welfare decomposition of GM coarse grain and oilseed 
adoption by the US, Canada and Argentina 
(% changes) 
 
(a) With no policy responses 
 










           
United States    70  -368  1204  939 
Canada    17  -43  101  72 
Argentina    19  -50  338  312 
Brazil    -18  -14  0  -36 
Other Latin America  70  55  0  125 
Australia    2  -11  0  -9 
New Zealand    0  -4  0  -5 
EU-15    181  102  0  267 
Eastern Europe  5  -1  0  7 
China    85  27  0  107 
India    3  -3  0  0 
Japan + Korea  98  239  0  322 
Other Asia    17  19  0  36 
South Africa    3  1  0  3 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   0  -2  0  -2 
Rest of World    98  54  0  152 
WORLD    647  0  1643  2290 
 
 
(b) With EU moratoria response 
 










           
United States    192  -690  1153  628 
Canada    17  -111  96  7 
Argentina    5  -89  330  247 
Brazil    100  125  0  256 
Other Latin America  79  106  0  184 
Australia    3  -7  0  -4 
New Zealand    0  2  0  2 
EU-15    -3431  288  0  -3145 
Eastern Europe  -15  1  0  -10 
China    85  28  0  111 
India    -3  6  0  3 
Japan + Korea  98  250  0  341 
Other Asia    13  33  0  44 
South Africa    2  5  0  7 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   1  12  0  15 
Rest of World    33  42  0  75 
WORLD    -2821  -1  1579  -1243 
 
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.  
Table 3:  Percentage change in farm household real income in selected regions, various GM adoption and policy response scenarios 
 
 
  US, Canada, and Argentina adopt  US, Canada, 
Argentina and 
EU adopt 












United States  -0.18  -0.36  -0.20  -0.19 
Canada  -0.26  -0.57  -0.28  -0.27 
Argentina  0.01  -0.10  0.00  0.00 
Brazil  -0.00  0.15  -0.01  -0.02 
Other Latin America  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07 
Australia  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04 
New Zealand  -0.03  0.00  -0.03  -0.03 
EU-15  -0.03  0.74  -0.05  -0.05 
Eastern Europe  -0.03  0.08  -0.03  -0.03 
China  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02 
India  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.03 
Japan + Korea  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Other Asia  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04 
South Africa  -0.03  0.02  -0.04  -0.04 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.01  0.04  -0.01  -0.01 
Rest of World  -0.04  0.03  -0.04  -0.04 
 
Source: Drawing on the authors’ GTAP model simulation results. 
  
 
                                                 
1 For studies that differentiate the degrees of factor/input saving, see van Meijl and 
van Tongeren (2002).  We ignore that complication because it makes little difference 
to the results being analysed here. 
2 This measure of impact on farmer income is different from the partial equilibrium 
measure of producer surplus used by, for example, Lindner and Jarrett (1978) who 
show that even with a completely inelastic demand curve a parallel shift (but not a 
pivotal shift) downwards in the supply curve will not reduce producer surplus. The 
measure of farm household income change used here can generate a loss for producers 
partly because it is a general equilibrium measure that also captures off-farm earnings 
of farm households, but also because the technology shock only applies to the GM 
varieties which then have to compete with the (sometimes preferred) non-GM 
varieties of that crop. Hence the price-depressing impact can more than offset the 
effect of the productivity improvement on profits of GM adopters. 
3 Further support for that hypothesis was found in another scenario, not reported here, 
in which the remaining OECD countries also ban coarse grain and oilseed imports 
from the adopting countries. In that scenario EU farmers benefit even more, giving 
them further reason to support EU consumer and environmental groups’ opposition to 
GM products. Farmers in Japan and Korea, by contrast, are worse off in that scenario. 
This is because they produce almost no feedgrains or oilseeds and so their large 
import-competing livestock sectors have a strong  interest in obtaining the lowest-
priced feedstuffs from abroad (and hence in preventing tough GM legislation), 
otherwise they will be less able to compete with foreign livestock producers. The 
much-less-stringent GM consumer policies in Japan and Korea are thus also 
consistent with the special-interest hypothesis. 